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On the revealed preference analysis of stable aggregate matchings

Thomas Demuynck and Umutcan Salman ()
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Umutcan Salman: Ecares, Université Libre de Bruxelles

Theoretical Economics, 2022, vol. 17, issue 4

Abstract: Echenique, Lee, Shum, and Yenmez (2013) established the testable revealed preference restrictions for stable aggregate matching with transferable (TU) and non-transferable utility (NTU) and for extremal stable matchings. In this paper, we rephrase their restrictions in terms of properties on a corresponding bipartite graph. From this, we obtain a simple condition that verifies whether a given aggregate matching is rationalisable. For matchings that are not rationalisable, we provide a simple greedy algorithm that computes the minimum number of matches that needs to be removed to obtain a rationalisable matching. We also show that the related problem of finding the minimum number of types that we need to remove in order to obtain a rationalisable matching is NP-complete.

Keywords: Revealed preference theory; two-sided matching markets; stability; computational complexity; matroid (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-11-22
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: On the Revealed Preference Analysis of Stable Aggregate Matchings (2022) Downloads
Working Paper: On the Revealed Preference Analysis of Stable Aggregate Matchings (2020) Downloads
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