Surplus sharing in Cournot oligopoly

Daniele Condorelli () and Balázs Szentes ()
Additional contact information
Daniele Condorelli: Department of Economics, University of Warwick
Balázs Szentes: Department of Economics, London School of Economics

Theoretical Economics, 2022, vol. 17, issue 3

Abstract: We characterize equilibria of oligopolistic markets where identical firms with constant marginal cost compete a' la Cournot. For given maximal willingness to pay and maximal total demand, we first identify all combinations of equilibrium consumer surplus and industry profit that can arise from arbitrary demand functions. Then, as a further restriction, we fix the average willingness to pay above marginal cost (i.e., first-best surplus) and identify all possible triples of consumer surplus, industry profit and deadweight loss.

Keywords: Cournot; monopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D42 D43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-07-14
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewFile/20220955/34309/998 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:4515

Access Statistics for this article

Theoretical Economics is currently edited by Simon Board, Federico Echenique, Todd D. Sarver, Juuso Toikka, Rakesh Vohra, Pierre-Olivier Weill

More articles in Theoretical Economics from Econometric Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Martin J. Osborne ().