Information aggregation in Poisson-elections

Mehmet Ekmekci () and Stephan Lauermann ()
Additional contact information
Stephan Lauermann: Department of Economics, University of Bonn

Theoretical Economics, 2022, vol. 17, issue 1

Abstract: The modern Condorcet jury theorem states that under weak conditions, when voters have common interests, elections will aggregate information when the population is large, in any equilibrium. Here, we study the performance of large elections with population uncertainty. We find that the modern Condorcet jury theorem holds if and only if the expected number of voters is independent of the state. If the expected number of voters depends on the state, then additional equilibria exist in which information is not aggregated. The main driving force is that, everything else equal, voters are more likely to be pivotal if the population is small.

Keywords: Political economy; voting; information aggregation; Poisson games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-01-20
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewFile/20220001/32988/940 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Information Aggregation in Poisson-Elections (2021)
Working Paper: Information Aggregation in Poisson-Elections (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:3849

Access Statistics for this article

Theoretical Economics is currently edited by Simon Board, Todd D. Sarver, Juuso Toikka, Rakesh Vohra, Pierre-Olivier Weill

More articles in Theoretical Economics from Econometric Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Martin J. Osborne ().