 Information Aggregation in Poisson-ElectionsStephan Lauermann and Mehmet Ekmekci () CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany Abstract: The modern Condorcet jury theorem states that under weak conditions, when voters have common interests, then elections will aggregate information when the population is large, in any responsive and symmetric equilibrium. Here, we study the performance of large elections with population uncertainty. We find that the modern Condorcet jury theorem holds if and only if the expected number of voters is independent of the state. If the expected number of voters depends on the state, then additional equilibria exist in which information is not aggregated. The main driving force is that, everything else equal, voters are more likely to be pivotal if the population is small. We provide conditions under which the additional equilibria are stable. We show that the Condorcet jury theorem also fails if abstention is allowed or if there is aggregate uncertainty due to the presence of noise voters. The presence of noise voters simplifies the analysis. Keywords: Voting; Poisson Games (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2019_125 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany Kaiserstr. 1, 53113 Bonn , Germany. |
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