Information Aggregation in Poisson-Elections

Mehmet Ekmekci (ekosistem@gmail.com) and Stephan Lauermann

No 80, ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series from University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany

Abstract: The modern Condorcet jury theorem states that under weak conditions, when voters have common interests, elections will aggregate information when the population is large, in any equilibrium. Here, we study the performance of large elections with population uncertainty. We find that the modern Condorcet jury theorem holds if and only if the expected number of voters is independent of the state. If the expected number of voters depends on the state, then additional equilibria exist in which information is not aggregated. The main driving force is that, everything else equal, voters are more likely to be pivotal if the population is small.

Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2021-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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https://www.econtribute.de/RePEc/ajk/ajkdps/ECONtribute_080_2021.pdf First version, 2021 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Information aggregation in Poisson-elections (2022)
Working Paper: Information Aggregation in Poisson-Elections (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:080

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