EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Which networks permit stable allocations? A theory of network-based comparisons

Chen Cheng () and Yiqing Xing ()
Additional contact information
Chen Cheng: Carey Business School, Johns Hopkins University
Yiqing Xing: Carey Business School, Johns Hopkins University

Theoretical Economics, 2022, vol. 17, issue 4

Abstract: Economic agents care about their relative well-being, and the comparisons are usually local. We capture this using a network model, in which an agent's payoff depends on the ranking of their allocation among their network neighbors’. Given a network, an allocation is called α-stable if no blocking coalition whose size is an α fraction of the population can strictly improve their payoffs. We find a sufficient and necessary condition for a network to permit an α-stable allocation: the network has an independent set whose size is at least 1−α of the network population. The characterization of permissive networks holds not only for our baseline ranking preference but also for a range of preferences under which the sets of stable allocations are expanded. We also provide a sufficient condition for an allocation to be stable. Extensions of the model concern directed networks and the case where agents have limited enforcement power.

Keywords: Network; social ranking; relative comparison; independent set; stable allocations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D72 D85 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-11-22
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewFile/20221473/35295/1028 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:4002

Access Statistics for this article

Theoretical Economics is currently edited by Simon Board, Todd D. Sarver, Juuso Toikka, Rakesh Vohra, Pierre-Olivier Weill

More articles in Theoretical Economics from Econometric Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Martin J. Osborne ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-20
Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:4002