Rational bubbles and middlemen

Yu Awaya (), Kohei Iwasaki and Makoto Watanabe
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Yu Awaya: Department of Economics, University of Rochester

Theoretical Economics, 2022, vol. 17, issue 4

Abstract: This paper develops a model of rational bubbles where trade of an asset takes place through a chain of middlemen. We show that there exists a unique and robust equilibrium, and a bubble can occur due to information frictions in bilateral and decentralized markets. Under reasonable assumptions, the equilibrium price is increasing and accelerating during bubbles although the fundamental value is constant over time. Bubbles may be detrimental to the economy, but any announcement from the central bank has no effect on welfare with risk neutral agents. Middlemen are the source of financial fragility.

Keywords: Rational bubbles; Middlemen; Higher-order uncertainty; Asymmetric information; Flippers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 D84 G12 G14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-11-22
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:4975

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