Incentive-compatible voting rules with positively correlated beliefs: correction

Abhigyan Bose and Souvik Roy ()
Additional contact information
Souvik Roy: Economic Research Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata

Theoretical Economics, 2022, vol. 17, issue 2

Abstract: Theorem 1 in Bhargava, Mohit et al. (2015) provides a necessary condition for a social choice function to be LOBIC with respect to a belief system satisfying top-set (TS) correlation. In this paper, we provide a counter example to that theorem and consequently provide a new necessary condition for the same in terms of sequential ordinal nondomination.

Keywords: Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility; correlated beliefs; sequential ordinal nondomination property (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-05-05
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewFile/20220929/33820/994 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:4495

Access Statistics for this article

Theoretical Economics is currently edited by Federico Echenique, Mira Frick, Pablo Kurlat, Juuso Toikka, Rakesh Vohra

More articles in Theoretical Economics from Econometric Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Martin J. Osborne ().