Bayesian comparative statics

Teddy Mekonnen and René Leal Vizcaíno (reneleal12@gmail.com)
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René Leal Vizcaíno: Economics Research Division, Banco de México

Theoretical Economics, 2022, vol. 17, issue 1

Abstract: We study how changes to the informativeness of signals in Bayesian games and single-agent decision problems affect the distribution of equilibrium actions. Focusing on supermodular environments, we provide conditions under which a more precise private signal for one agent leads to an increasing-mean spread or a decreasing-mean spread of equilibrium actions for all agents. We apply our comparative statics to information disclosure games between a sender and many receivers and derive sufficient conditions on the primitive payoffs that lead to extremal disclosure of information.

Keywords: Comparative statics; supermodular order; convex order; information disclosure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C44 C61 D42 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-01-20
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Bayesian Comparative Statics (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:4345

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