Asynchronicity and coordination in common and opposing interest games

, (), , (), , () and , ()
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,: Department of Economics, Finance and Control, EMLYON Business School
,: Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University
,: Finance Department, HEC Paris and GREGHEC
,: Stanford Graduate School of Business
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Stefano Lovo

Theoretical Economics, 2014, vol. 9, issue 2

Abstract: We study games endowed with a pre-play phase in which players prepare the actions that will be implemented at a predetermined deadline. In the preparation phase, each player stochastically receives opportunities to revise her actions, and the finally-revised action is taken at the deadline. In 2-player \textquotedblleft common interest" games, where there exists a best action profile for all players, this best action profile is the only equilibrium outcome of the dynamic game. In \textquotedblleft opposing interest" games, which are $2\times 2$ games with Pareto-unranked strict Nash equilibria, the equilibrium outcome of the dynamic game is generically unique and corresponds to one of the stage-game strict Nash equilibria. Which equilibrium prevails depends on the payoff structure and on the relative frequency of the arrivals of revision opportunities for each of the players.

Keywords: Revision games; pre-opening; finite horizon; equilibrium selection; asynchronous moves (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-05-16
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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