Implementation in multidimensional dichotomous domains

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,: Economics and Planning Unit, Indian Statistical Institute
,: Economics and Planning Unit, Indian Statistical Institute
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Debasis Mishra and Souvik Roy

Theoretical Economics, 2013, vol. 8, issue 2

Abstract: We consider deterministic dominant strategy implementation in multidimensional dichotomous domains in private values and quasi-linear utility setting. In such multidimensional domains, an agent’s type is characterized by a single number, the value of the agent, and a non-empty set of acceptable alternatives. Each acceptable alternative gives the agent utility equal to his value and other alternatives give him zero utility. We identity a new condition, which we call generation monotonicity, that is necessary and sufficient for implementability in any dichotomous domain. If such a domain satisfies a richness condition, then a weaker version of generation monotonicity, which we call 2-generation monotonicity (equivalent to 3-cycle monotonicity), is necessary and sufficient for implementation. We use this result to derive the optimal mechanism in a one-sided matching problem with agents having dichotomous types.

Keywords: Dominant strategy implementation; cycle monotonicity; dichotomous preferences; generation monotonicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 C79 D02 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-05-17
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Working Paper: Implementation in multidimensional dichotomous domains (2011)
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