Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games

, () and , P. ()
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,: Department of Economics, Rutgers University
, P.: Department of Economics, Rutgers University
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau and Richard P. McLean

Theoretical Economics, 2014, vol. 9, issue 3

Abstract: We prove the existence of a pure-strategy trembling-hand perfect equilibrium in upper semicontinuous potential games, and we show that generic potential games possess pure-strategy strictly perfect and essential equilibria. We also establish a more powerful result: the set of maximizers of an upper semicontinuous potential contains a strategically stable set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria.

Keywords: Discontinuous game; potential game; trembling-hand perfect equilibrium; stable set; essential equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-10-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Working Paper: Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games (2011)
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