Economics at your fingertips  

Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring

Takuo Sugaya () and Alexander Wolitzky
Additional contact information
Takuo Sugaya: Graduate School of Business, Stanford University

Theoretical Economics, 2017, vol. 12, issue 2

Abstract: We provide a simple sufficient condition for the existence of a recursive upper bound on (the Pareto frontier of) the sequential equilibrium payoff set at a fixed discount factor in two-player repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. The bounding set is the sequential equilibrium payoff set with perfect monitoring and a mediator. We show that this bounding set admits a simple recursive characterization, which nonetheless necessarily involves the use of private strategies. Under our condition, this set describes precisely those payoff vectors that arise in equilibrium for some private monitoring structure, if either non-stationary monitoring or communication is allowed.

Keywords: Repeated games; private monitoring (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-05-30
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this article

Theoretical Economics is currently edited by Simon Board, Federico Echenique, Thomas Mariotti, Florian Scheuer, Ran Spiegler

More articles in Theoretical Economics from Econometric Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Martin J. Osborne ().

Page updated 2019-10-09
Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:2270