On the equivalence of large individualized and distributionalized games

M. Khan, Kali P. Rath (), Haomiao Yu and Yongchao Zhang ()
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Kali P. Rath: Department of Economics, University of Notre Dame

Theoretical Economics, 2017, vol. 12, issue 2

Abstract: The theory of large one-shot simultaneous-play games with a bio-social typology has been presented in both the individualized and distributionalized forms, LIG and LDG respectively. Using an example of an LDG with two actions and a single trait in which some Nash equilibrium distributions cannot be induced by the Nash equilibria of the representing LIG, this paper offers three equivalence results that delineate a relationship between the two game-forms. Our analysis also reveals the different roles that the Lebesgue unit interval and a saturated space play in the theory.

Keywords: Distributionalized games; individualized games; Nash equilibrium distribution; Nash equilibrium; representation; equivalence; weak-equivalence; quasi-equivalence; realization; similarity; symmetry; countability; saturation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 D50 D82 G13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-05-30
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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