On the equivalence of large individualized and distributionalized games

M. Khan, Kali P. Rath (), Haomiao Yu and Yongchao Zhang ()
Additional contact information
Kali P. Rath: Department of Economics, University of Notre Dame

Theoretical Economics, 2017, vol. 12, issue 2

Abstract: The theory of large one-shot simultaneous-play games with a bio-social typology has been presented in both the individualized and distributionalized forms, LIG and LDG respectively. Using an example of an LDG with two actions and a single trait in which some Nash equilibrium distributions cannot be induced by the Nash equilibria of the representing LIG, this paper offers three equivalence results that delineate a relationship between the two game-forms. Our analysis also reveals the different roles that the Lebesgue unit interval and a saturated space play in the theory.

Keywords: Distributionalized games; individualized games; Nash equilibrium distribution; Nash equilibrium; representation; equivalence; weak-equivalence; quasi-equivalence; realization; similarity; symmetry; countability; saturation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 D50 D82 G13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-05-30
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewFile/20170533/17938/544 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:1806

Access Statistics for this article

Theoretical Economics is currently edited by Simon Board, Todd D. Sarver, Juuso Toikka, Rakesh Vohra, Pierre-Olivier Weill

More articles in Theoretical Economics from Econometric Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Martin J. Osborne ().