Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: a necessary and sufficient condition
Yuichiro Kamada () and
Fuhito Kojima ()
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Yuichiro Kamada: Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley
Fuhito Kojima: Department of Economics, Stanford University
Theoretical Economics, 2018, vol. 13, issue 2
Distributional constraints are common features in many real matching markets, such as medical residency matching, school admissions, and teacher assignment. We develop a general theory of matching mechanisms under distributional constraints. We identify the necessary and sufficient condition on the constraint structure for the existence of a mechanism that is stable and strategy-proof for the individuals. Our proof exploits a connection between a matching problem under distributional constraints and a matching problem with contracts.
Keywords: Matching with constraints; medical residency matching; school choice; stability; strategy-proofness; matching with contracts; hierarchy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D47 D61 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:2717
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