One dimensional mechanism design
Herve Moulin ()
Theoretical Economics, 2017, vol. 12, issue 2
We prove a general possibility result for collective decision problems where individual allocations are one-dimensional, preferences are single-peaked (strictly convex), and feasible allocation profiles cover a closed convex set. Special cases include the celebrated median voter theorem and the division of a non disposable commodity by the uniform rationing rule. We construct a canonical peak-only rule equalizing in the leximin sense individual gains from an arbitrary benchmark allocation: it is efficient, group-strategyproof, fair, and (for most problems) continuous. These properties leave room for many other rules, except for symmetric non disposable division problems.
Keywords: Single-peaked preferences; strategy-proofness; leximin ordering (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:2307
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