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Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in economies with many goods

Takeshi Momi ()

Theoretical Economics, 2017, vol. 12, issue 3

Abstract: In this paper, we show that in pure exchange economies where the number of goods equals or exceeds the number of agents, any Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanism always allocates the total endowment to some single agent even if the receivers vary.

Keywords: Social choice; strategy-proofness; Pareto efficiency; exchange economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-09-26
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