Ruth, anthony, and clarence

Jeffrey C. Ely ()
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Jeffrey C. Ely: Department of Economics, Northwestern University

Theoretical Economics, Forthcoming

Abstract: Non-partisan voters can become polarized not because of ideology but because it is optimal for them to remain uninformed and cancel out the votes of uninformed voters on “the other side.” Indeed, when stuck in such a state of polarization it is socially optimal to do so. Dynamics can lead an otherwise well-functioning assem- bly into irreversible polarization. Reputation effects might only make things worse.

Keywords: Clarence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-04-09
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