Optimal inquiry

Tai Wei Hu () and Andriy Zapechelnyuk ()
Additional contact information
Tai Wei Hu: Department of Economics, University of Bristol
Andriy Zapechelnyuk: School of Economics, University of Edinburgh

Theoretical Economics, Forthcoming

Abstract: A decision maker acquires and processes information about an uncertain state of nature through an inquiry: a contingent sequence of questions ending in a decision. Inquiries are costly, with cost proportional to their length. We characterize optimal inquiries, which determine both which decisions are considered and which are prioritized, in the sense of being reached after fewer questions. We show that optimal inquiries generate endogenous confirmation: relative to the no-cost benchmark, they expand the set of states in which the decision maker chooses the most likely decisions. An optimal inquiry may also treat ex ante symmetric options differently, prioritizing some while deprioritizing or excluding others. To an observer who ignores inquiry costs, these choices may appear biased.

Keywords: Bounded rationality; information theory; rational inattention; attention span; confirmation bias; consideration set; framing; search satisficing; tunnel vision (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-10-23
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewForthcomingFile/6926/46659/1 Working paper version. Paper will be copyedited and typeset before publication. (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:6926

Access Statistics for this article

Theoretical Economics is currently edited by Federico Echenique, Mira Frick, Pablo Kurlat, Juuso Toikka, Rakesh Vohra

More articles in Theoretical Economics from Econometric Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Editor Theoretical Economics ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).