Information design in smooth games

Alex Smolin and Takuro Yamashita ()
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Takuro Yamashita: Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Theoretical Economics, Forthcoming

Abstract: We study information design in games where players choose from a continuum of actions and have continuously differentiable payoffs. We show that an information structure is optimal when the equilibrium it induces can also be implemented in a principal-agent contracting problem. Building on this result, we characterize optimal information structures in symmetric linear-quadratic games. With common values, targeted disclosure is robustly optimal across all priors. With interdependent and normally distributed values, linear disclosure is uniquely optimal. We illustrate our findings with applications in venture capital, Bayesian polarization, and price competition.

Keywords: Bayesian persuasion; information design; dual certification; first-order approach; linear-quadratic games; targeted disclosure; gaussian coupling; linear disclosure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-05-06
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http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewForthcomingFile/6143/45019/1 Working paper version. Paper will be copyedited and typeset before publication. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Information Design in Smooth Games (2026)
Working Paper: Information Design in Smooth Games (2025)
Working Paper: Information Design in Smooth Games (2025)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:6143

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