Information Design in Smooth Games

Alex Smolin and Takuro Yamashita

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: We study information design in games where players choose from a continuum of ac-tions and have continuously differentiable payoffs. We show that an information structure is optimal when the equilibrium it induces can also be implemented in a principal-agent contracting problem. Building on this result, we characterize optimal information struc-tures in symmetric linear-quadratic games. With common values, targeted disclosure is robustly optimal across all priors. With interdependent and normally distributed values, linear disclosure is uniquely optimal. We illustrate our findings with applications in venture capital, Bayesian polarization, and price competition.

Keywords: Information design; Dual certification; First-order approach; Linear-quadratic games; Targeted disclosure; Gaussian coupling; Linea; Disclosure; Bayesian persuasion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-10-10
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Working Paper: Information Design in Smooth Games (2025)
Working Paper: Information Design in Smooth Games (2025)
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