Information Design in Smooth Games

Alex Smolin and Takuro Yamashita

No 25-1671, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: We study information design in games where players choose from a continuum of ac-tions and have continuously differentiable payoffs. We show that an information structure is optimal when the equilibrium it induces can also be implemented in a principal-agent contracting problem. Building on this result, we characterize optimal information struc-tures in symmetric linear-quadratic games. With common values, targeted disclosure is robustly optimal across all priors. With interdependent and normally distributed values, linear disclosure is uniquely optimal. We illustrate our findings with applications in venture capital, Bayesian polarization, and price competition.

Keywords: Bayesian persuasion; information design; dual certification; first-order approach; linear-quadratic games; targeted disclosure; Gaussian coupling, linea; disclosure. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta, nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Working Paper: Information Design in Smooth Games (2025)
Working Paper: Information Design in Smooth Games (2025)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:130998

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