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Information Design in Smooth Games

Alex Smolin and Takuro Yamashita

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Abstract: We study information design in games in which each player has a continuum of actions. We show that an information structure is designer-optimal whenever the equilibrium play it induces can also be implemented in a principal-agent contracting problem. We use this observation to solve three novel applications. In an investment game, the optimal structure fully informs a single investor while providing no information to others. In an expectation polarization game, the optimal structure fully informs half of the players while providing no information to the other half. In a price competition game, the optimal structure is noise-free Gaussian and recommends prices linearly in the states. Our analysis further informs on the robustness and uniqueness of the optimal information structures.

Date: 2022-02, Revised 2023-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta, nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
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