Information design in multi-stage games

Miltiadis Makris () and Ludovic Renou
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Miltiadis Makris: Department of Economics, University of Essex

Theoretical Economics, 2023, vol. 18, issue 4

Abstract: This paper generalizes the concept of Bayes correlated equilibrium (Bergemann and Morris, 2016) to multi-stage games. We apply our characterization results to a number of illustrative examples and applications.

Keywords: Multi-stage games; information design; communication equilibrium; sequential communication equilibrium; information structures; Bayes correlated equilibrium; revelation principle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-11-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Information Design in Multi-stage Games (2021)
Working Paper: Information design in multi-stage games (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:4769

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