Information Design in Multi-stage Games

Miltiadis Makris and Ludovic Renou

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper generalizes the concept of Bayes correlated equilibrium (Bergemann and Morris, 2016) to multi-stage games. We demonstrate the power of our characterization results by applying them to a number of illustrative examples and applications.

Date: 2021-02, Revised 2021-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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http://arxiv.org/pdf/2102.13482 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Information design in multi-stage games (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2102.13482

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