Information design in multi-stage games

Miltiadis Makris and Ludovic Renou

No 861, Working Papers from Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance

Abstract: We consider multi-stage games, where at each stage, players receive private signals about past and current states, past actions and past signals, and choose actions. We fully characterise the distributions over actions, states, and signals that obtain in any (sequential) communication equilibrium of any expansion of multi-stage games, i.e., when players can receive additional signals about past and current states, past actions, and past and current signals (including the additional past signals). We interpret our results as revelation principles for information design problems. We apply our characterisation to bilateral bargaining problems.

Keywords: multi-stage games; information design; communication equilibrium; sequential communication equilibrium; information structures; Bayes correlated equilibrium; revelation principle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-06-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth, nep-ict and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Information design in multi-stage games (2023)
Working Paper: Information Design in Multi-stage Games (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:861

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