Robust performance evaluation of independent agents

Ashwin Kambhampati ()
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Ashwin Kambhampati: Department of Economics, United States Naval Academy

Theoretical Economics, 2024, vol. 19, issue 3

Abstract: A principal provides incentives for independent agents. The principal cannot observe the agents' actions, nor does she know the entire set of actions available to them. It is shown that an anti-informativeness principle holds: very generally, robustly optimal contracts must link the incentive pay of the agents. In symmetric and binary environments, they must exhibit joint performance evaluation — each agent's pay is increasing in the performance of the other.

Keywords: Moral hazard; robustness; teams (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 D82 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-07-24
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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