Slow persuasion

Matteo Escudé and Ludvig Sinander ()
Additional contact information
Ludvig Sinander: Department of Economics and Nuffield College, University of Oxford

Theoretical Economics, 2023, vol. 18, issue 1

Abstract: What are the value and form of optimal persuasion when information can be generated only slowly? We study this question in a dynamic model in which a `sender' provides public information over time subject to a graduality constraint, and a decision-maker takes an action in each period. Using a novel `viscosity' dynamic programming principle, we characterise the sender's equilibrium value function and information provision. We show that the graduality constraint inhibits information provision relative to unconstrained persuasion. The gap can be substantial, but closes as the constraint slackens. Contrary to unconstrained persuasion, less-than-full information may be provided even if players have aligned preferences but different prior beliefs.

Keywords: Persuasion; information; gradual; dynamic; viscosity; constrained (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 C65 C73 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-01-18
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewFile/20230129/35730/1062 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Slow persuasion (2022)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:5175

Access Statistics for this article

Theoretical Economics is currently edited by Simon Board, Todd D. Sarver, Juuso Toikka, Rakesh Vohra, Pierre-Olivier Weill

More articles in Theoretical Economics from Econometric Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Martin J. Osborne ().