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Strategic research funding

Matteo Escud\'e and Ludvig Sinander

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Abstract: We study a dynamic game in which information arrives gradually as long as a principal funds research, and an agent takes an action in each period. In equilibrium, the principal's patience is the key determinant of her information provision: the lower her discount rate, the more eagerly she funds. When she is sufficiently patient, her information provision and value function are well-approximated by the 'Bayesian persuasion' model. If the conflict of interest is purely belief-based and information is valuable, then she provides full information if she is patient. We also obtain a sharp characterisation of the principal's value function. Our proofs rely on a novel dynamic programming principle rooted in the theory of viscosity solutions of differential equations.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
Date: 2019-03
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