Regret-free truth-telling in school choice with consent

Yiqiu Chen () and Markus Möller ()
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Yiqiu Chen: Department of Management, Economics and Social Sciences, University of Cologne
Markus Möller: Department of Economics, University of Bonn

Theoretical Economics, 2024, vol. 19, issue 2

Abstract: The Efficiency Adjusted Deferred Acceptance Rule (EDA) is a promising candidate mechanism for public school assignment. A potential drawback of EDA is that it could encourage students to game the system since it is not strategy-proof. However, to successfully strategize, students typically need information that is unlikely to be available to them in practice. We model school choice under incomplete information and show that EDA is regret-free truth-telling, which is a weaker incentive property than strategy-proofness and was introduced by Fernandez 2020. We also show that there is no efficient matching rule that weakly Pareto dominates a stable matching rule and is regret-free truth-telling. Note that the original version of EDA by Kesten 2010 weakly Pareto dominates a stable matching rule, but it is not efficient.

Keywords: School choice; matching; efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance; regret; manipulation; stable-dominating (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D81 D82 I20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-05-13
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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