Pair-efficient reallocation of indivisible objects

Özgün Ekici

Theoretical Economics, 2024, vol. 19, issue 2

Abstract: We revisit the classical object reallocation problem under strict preferences. When attention is constrained to the set of Pareto-efficient rules, it is known that top trading cycles (TTC) is the only rule that is strategyproof and individually-rational. We relax this constraint and consider pair-efficiency. A rule is pair-efficient if it never induces an allocation at which a pair of agents gain from trading their assigned objects. Remarkably, even in the larger set of pair-efficient rules, we find that TTC is still the only rule that is strategyproof and individually-rational. Our characterization result gives strong support to the use of TTC in object reallocation problems.

Keywords: Indivisible object; pair-efficient; strategyproof; individually-rational; Top trading cycles (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D61 D63 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-05-13
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewFile/20240551/39111/1185 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:5471

Access Statistics for this article

Theoretical Economics is currently edited by Federico Echenique, Mira Frick, Pablo Kurlat, Juuso Toikka, Rakesh Vohra

More articles in Theoretical Economics from Econometric Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Martin J. Osborne ().