The limits of ex post implementation without transfers

Tangren Feng (), Axel Niemeyer () and Qinggong Wu ()
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Tangren Feng: Department of Decision Sciences and IGIER, Bocconi University
Axel Niemeyer: Department of Economics, University of Bonn
Qinggong Wu: Department of Economics, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

Theoretical Economics, 2023, vol. 18, issue 2

Abstract: We study ex post implementation in collective decision problems where monetary transfers cannot be used. We find that deterministic ex post implementation is impossible if the underlying environment is neither almost an environment with private values nor almost one with common values. Thus, desirable properties of ex post implementation such as informational robustness become difficult to achieve when preference interdependence and preference heterogeneity are both present in the environment.

Keywords: Ex post implementation; interdependent values; non-transferable utility; mechanism design; collective decision-making; informational robustness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-05-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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