On guarantees, vetoes and random dictators

Anna Bogomolnaia (), Ron Holzman () and Herve Moulin
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Anna Bogomolnaia: Adam Smith Business School University of Glasgow and CNRS Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne
Ron Holzman: Department of Mathematics, Technion-Israel Institute of Technology

Theoretical Economics, 2023, vol. 18, issue 1

Abstract: A mechanism guarantees a certain welfare level to its agents, if each of them can secure that level against unanimously adversarial others. How high can such a guarantee be, and what type of mechanism achieves it? In the n-person probabilistic voting/bargaining model with p deterministic outcomes a guarantee takes the form of a probability distribution over the ranks from 1 to p. If n≥p the uniform lottery is shown to be the only maximal (unimprovable) guarantee. If n

Keywords: Worst case; guarantees; voting by veto; random dictator (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-01-18
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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