On guarantees, vetoes and random dictators

Anna Bogomolnaia (), Ron Holzman () and Herve Moulin
Additional contact information
Anna Bogomolnaia: Adam Smith Business School University of Glasgow and CNRS Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne
Ron Holzman: Department of Mathematics, Technion-Israel Institute of Technology

Theoretical Economics, 2023, vol. 18, issue 1

Abstract: A mechanism guarantees a certain welfare level to its agents, if each of them can secure that level against unanimously adversarial others. How high can such a guarantee be, and what type of mechanism achieves it? In the n-person probabilistic voting/bargaining model with p deterministic outcomes a guarantee takes the form of a probability distribution over the ranks from 1 to p. If n≥p the uniform lottery is shown to be the only maximal (unimprovable) guarantee. If n

Keywords: Worst case; guarantees; voting by veto; random dictator (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-01-18
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewFile/20230097/35728/1060 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:4832

Access Statistics for this article

Theoretical Economics is currently edited by Federico Echenique, Mira Frick, Pablo Kurlat, Juuso Toikka, Rakesh Vohra

More articles in Theoretical Economics from Econometric Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Martin J. Osborne ().