Existence of monotone equilibria in large double auctions

Paulo Barelli and Srihari Govindan

Theoretical Economics, 2024, vol. 19, issue 2

Abstract: We provide a shorter proof of the main result in Reny and Perry (Econometrica 2006), by establishing a lower semicontinuity property of auctions as the number of traders goes to infinity, leveraging existence of equilibria in the limit "auction". Our proof also eliminates two of the assumptions in their paper.

Keywords: Monotone equilibrium; large auctions; rational expectations equilibrium; degree theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-05-13
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