Incentives in matching markets: counting and comparing manipulating agents

Somouaoga Bonkoungou () and Alexander Nesterov
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Somouaoga Bonkoungou: Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Lausanne, Internef, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland

Theoretical Economics, 2023, vol. 18, issue 3

Abstract: Manipulability is a threat to the successful design of centralized matching markets. However, in many applications some manipulation is inevitable and the designer wants to compare manipulable mechanisms. We count the number of agents with an incentive to manipulate and rank mechanisms by their level of manipulability. This ranking sheds a new light on practical design decisions such as the design of the entry-level medical labor market in the US, and school admissions systems in New York, Chicago, Denver and many cities in Ghana and in the UK.

Keywords: Market design; two-sided matching; college admissions; school choice; manipulability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 D78 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-07-20
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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