Stable matching: an integer programming approach

Chao Huang ()
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Chao Huang: Institute for Social and Economic Research, Nanjing Audit University

Theoretical Economics, 2023, vol. 18, issue 1

Abstract: This paper develops an integer programming approach to two-sided many-to-one matching by investigating stable integral matchings of a fictitious market where each worker is divisible. We show that stable matching exists in a discrete matching market when firms' preference profile satisfies a unimodularity condition that is compatible with various forms of complementarities. We provide a class of firms' preference profiles that satisfy the unimodularity condition.

Keywords: Two-sided matching; stability; integer programming; many-to-one matching; complementarity; unimodularity; demand type (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 C78 D47 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-01-18
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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