Equilibrium existence in games with ties

Wojciech Olszewski () and Ron Siegel ()
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Wojciech Olszewski: Department of Economics, Northwestern University
Ron Siegel: Department of Economics, The Pennsylvania State University

Theoretical Economics, 2023, vol. 18, issue 2

Abstract: We provide conditions that simplify applying Reny's (1999) better-reply security to Bayesian games, and use these conditions to prove the existence of equilibria for classes of games in which payoff discontinuities arise only at "ties." These games include a general version of all-pay contests, first-prize auctions with common values, and Hotelling models with incomplete information.

Keywords: Equilibrium existence; discontinuous games; better-reply security (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D82 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-05-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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