Attack and interception in networks

Francis Bloch, Kalyan Chatterjee () and Bhaskar Dutta ()
Additional contact information
Kalyan Chatterjee: Penn State University
Bhaskar Dutta: Department of Economics, University of Warwick and Ashoka University

Theoretical Economics, 2023, vol. 18, issue 4

Abstract: This paper studies a game of attack and interception in a network, where a single attacker chooses a target and a path, and each node chooses a level of protection. We show that the Nash equilibrium of the game exists and is unique. We characterize equilibrium attack paths and attack distributions as a function of the underlying network and target values. We show that adding a link or increasing the value of a target may harm the attacker - a comparative statics effect which is reminiscent of Braess's paradox in transportation economics. Finally, we contrast the Nash equilibrium with the equilibria of two variations of the model: one where all nodes cooperate in interception and one where nodes update their beliefs and make inspection decisions upon observing the arrival of a suspicious object.

Keywords: Keywords: Network interdiction; networks; attack and defense; inspection games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D85 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-11-09
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewFile/20231511/37905/1144 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Attack and Interception in Networks (2021)
Working Paper: Attack and Interception in Networks (2021)
Working Paper: Attack and Interception in Networks (2021)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:5122

Access Statistics for this article

Theoretical Economics is currently edited by Federico Echenique, Mira Frick, Pablo Kurlat, Juuso Toikka, Rakesh Vohra

More articles in Theoretical Economics from Econometric Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Martin J. Osborne ().