Attack and interception in networks

Francis Bloch, Kalyan Chatterjee () and Bhaskar Dutta ()
Additional contact information
Kalyan Chatterjee: Penn State University
Bhaskar Dutta: Department of Economics, University of Warwick and Ashoka University

Theoretical Economics, 2023, vol. 18, issue 4

Abstract: This paper studies a game of attack and interception in a network, where a single attacker chooses a target and a path, and each node chooses a level of protection. We show that the Nash equilibrium of the game exists and is unique. We characterize equilibrium attack paths and attack distributions as a function of the underlying network and target values. We show that adding a link or increasing the value of a target may harm the attacker - a comparative statics effect which is reminiscent of Braess's paradox in transportation economics. Finally, we contrast the Nash equilibrium with the equilibria of two variations of the model: one where all nodes cooperate in interception and one where nodes update their beliefs and make inspection decisions upon observing the arrival of a suspicious object.

Keywords: Keywords: Network interdiction; networks; attack and defense; inspection games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D85 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-11-09
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Attack and Interception in Networks (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:5122

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