Information aggregation in competitive markets

Lucas Siga () and Maximilian Mihm ()
Additional contact information
Lucas Siga: Division of Social Science, NYU Abu Dhabi
Maximilian Mihm: Division of Social Science, NYU Abu Dhabi

Theoretical Economics, 2021, vol. 16, issue 1

Abstract: We study when equilibrium prices can aggregate information in an auction market with a large population of traders. Our main result identifies a property of information---the betweenness property---that is both necessary and sufficient for information aggregation. The characterization provides novel predictions about equilibrium prices in complex, multidimensional environments.

Keywords: Auctions; betweenness; competitive markets; information aggregation; rational expectations equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D82 D83 G14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-01-15
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewFile/20210161/29622/852 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:3559

Access Statistics for this article

Theoretical Economics is currently edited by Simon Board, Todd D. Sarver, Juuso Toikka, Rakesh Vohra, Pierre-Olivier Weill

More articles in Theoretical Economics from Econometric Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Martin J. Osborne ().