Agendas in legislative decision-making

Sean Horan

Theoretical Economics, 2021, vol. 16, issue 1

Abstract: Despite the wide variety of agendas used in legislative settings, the literature on sophisticated voting has focused on two formats, the so-called Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agendas. In the current paper, I introduce a broad class of agendas whose defining structural features, history-independence and persistence, are common in legislative settings. I then characterize the social choice rules implemented by sophisticated voting on agendas with these two features. I also characterize the rules implemented by more specialized formats (called priority agendas and convex agendas) whose structure is closely related to the prevailing rules for order-of-voting used by legislatures. These results establish a clear connection between structure and outcomes for a wide range of legislative agendas.

Keywords: Majority voting; sophisticated voting; agendas; committees; implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D02 D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-01-15
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Agendas in legislative decision-making (2016)
Working Paper: Agendas in Legislative Decision-Making (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:2618

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