Strict pure strategy Nash equilibria in large finite-player games

Guilherme Carmona and Konrad Podczeck ()
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Konrad Podczeck: Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Universität Wien

Theoretical Economics, 2021, vol. 16, issue 3

Abstract: In the context of anonymous games (i.e., games where the payoff of a player is, apart from his/her own action, determined by the distribution of the actions made by the other players) we present a model in which, generically (in a precise sense), finite-player games have strict pure strategy Nash equilibria if the number of agents is large. A key feature of our model is that payoff functions have differentiability properties. A consequence of our existence result is that, in our model, equilibrium distributions of non-atomic games are asymptotically implementable by pure strategy Nash equilibria of large finite-player games.

Keywords: Large games; pure strategy; Nash equilibrium; generic property (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-07-22
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:3967

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