Local global equivalence in voting models: a characterization and applications

Ujjwal Kumar (), Souvik Roy (), Arunava Sen (), Sonal Yadav () and Huaxia Zeng ()
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Ujjwal Kumar: Economic Research Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata
Souvik Roy: Economic Research Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata
Arunava Sen: Economics and Planning Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India
Sonal Yadav: Department of Economics, Umea University
Huaxia Zeng: School of Economics, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics

Theoretical Economics, 2021, vol. 16, issue 4

Abstract: The paper considers a voting model where each voter's type is her preference. The type graph for a voter is a graph whose nodes are the possible types of the voter. A social choice function is locally strategy-proof if no type of a voter can gain by misrepresentation to a type that is connected to her true type by an edge in the type graph. A social choice function is strategy-proof if no type of a voter can gain by misrepresentation to an arbitrary type. Local-Global equivalence (LGE) is satisfied if local strategy-proofness implies strategy-proofness. The paper identifies a condition on the graph that characterizes LGE. Our notion of ``localness'' is perfectly general - we use this feature of our model to identify notions of localness according to which various models of multi-dimensional voting satisfy LGE. Finally, we show that LGE for deterministic social choice functions does not imply LGE for random social choice functions.

Keywords: Local incentive constraints; strategy-proofness; mechanism design; strategic voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-11-08
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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