Simple bets to elicit private signals

Aurelien Baillon () and Yan Xu ()
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Aurelien Baillon: Erasmus School of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam
Yan Xu: Department of Economics, University of Vienna

Theoretical Economics, 2021, vol. 16, issue 3

Abstract: This paper introduces two simple betting mechanisms, Top-Flop and Threshold betting, to elicit unverifiable information from crowds. Agents are offered bets on the rating of an item about which they received a private signal versus that of a random item. We characterize conditions for the chosen bet to reveal the agents' private signal even if the underlying ratings are biased. We further provide micro-economic foundations of the ratings, which are endogenously determined by the actions of other agents in a game setting. Our mechanisms relax standard assumptions of the literature, such as common prior, and homogeneous and risk neutral agents.

Keywords: Bets; private signals; Bayesian game; elicitation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-07-21
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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