Simple bets to elicit private signals

Aurélien Baillon () and Yan Xu
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Aurélien Baillon: Erasmus University Rotterdam
Yan Xu: Universität Wien = University of Vienna

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Abstract: This paper introduces two simple betting mechanisms, Top-Flop and Threshold betting, to elicit unverifiable information from crowds. Agents are offered bets on the rating of an item about which they received a private signal versus that of a random item. We characterize conditions for the chosen bet to reveal the agents' private signal even if the underlying ratings are biased. We further provide micro-economic foundations of the ratings, which are endogenously determined by the actions of other agents in a game setting. Our mechanisms relax standard assumptions of the literature, such as common prior, and homogeneous and risk neutral agents.

Keywords: Bets; Private signals; Bayesian game; Elicitation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-07-01
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04325606v1
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Published in Theoretical Economics, 2021, 16 (3), pp.777-797. ⟨10.3982/TE4343⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04325606

DOI: 10.3982/TE4343

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