Games with information constraints: seeds and spillovers

Simone Galperti () and Jacopo Perego ()
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Simone Galperti: Department of Economics, University California, San Diego
Jacopo Perego: Department of Economics, Columbia University

Theoretical Economics, Forthcoming

Abstract: We study equilibrium behavior in incomplete-information games under two information constraints: seeds and spillovers. The former restricts which agents can initially receive information. The latter specifies how this information spills over to other agents. Our main result characterizes the equilibrium outcomes under these constraints, without making additional assumptions about the agents' initial information. This involves deriving a “revelation-principle” result for settings in which a mediator cannot communicate directly or privately with the agents. Our model identifies which spillovers are more restrictive and which seeds are more influential. We apply our results to a problem of optimal organization design.

Keywords: Information; spillovers; seeding; networks; correlated equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 D85 M3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-09-17
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