Evidence and skepticism in verifiable disclosure games

Daniel Rappoport (daniel.rappoport@chicagobooth.edu)
Additional contact information
Daniel Rappoport: Booth School of Business, University of Chicago

Theoretical Economics, Forthcoming

Abstract: A key feature of communication with evidence is skepticism: a receiver will attribute any incomplete disclosure to the sender concealing unfavorable evidence. I study when a change in the receiver’s prior belief about the sender’s evidence induces more skepticism, i.e. induces the receiver, regardless of his preferences, to take an equilibrium action that is less favorable for the sender following every message. I provide a definition of when one receiver prior belief expects more evidence than another and show that this characterizes more skepticism. As an input, I fully characterize receiver optimal equilibrium outcomes in general verifiable disclosure games.

Keywords: Evidence; verifiable disclosure; skepticism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-03-26
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewForthcomingFile/5423/41628/1 Working paper version. Paper will be copyedited and typeset before publication. (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:5423

Access Statistics for this article

Theoretical Economics is currently edited by Simon Board, Todd D. Sarver, Juuso Toikka, Rakesh Vohra, Pierre-Olivier Weill

More articles in Theoretical Economics from Econometric Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Martin J. Osborne (martin.osborne@utoronto.ca).