Efficient and strategy-proof mechanism under general constraints

Kenzo Imamura () and Yasushi Kawase ()
Additional contact information
Kenzo Imamura: Department of Economics, University of Tokyo
Yasushi Kawase: Graduate School of Information Science and Technology, University of Tokyo

Theoretical Economics, 2025, vol. 20, issue 2

Abstract: This study investigates efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods under constraints. First, we examine a setting without endowments. In this setting, we introduce a class of constraints, ordered accessibility, for which the serial dictatorship mechanism is Pareto-efficient (PE), individually rational (IR), and group strategy-proof (GSP). Then, we prove that accessibility is a necessary condition for the existence of PE, IR, and GSP mechanisms. Moreover, we show that the SD mechanism with a dynamically constructed order satisfies PE, IR, and GSP if one school has an arbitrary accessible constraint and each of the other schools has a capacity constraint. Second, we examine a setting with endowments. We find that the \emph{generalized matroid} is a necessary and sufficient condition on the constraint structure for the existence of a mechanism that is PE, IR, and strategy-proof (SP). We also demonstrate that a top trading cycles mechanism satisfies PE, IR, and GSP under any generalized matroid constraint. Finally, we observe that any two out of the three properties---PE, IR, and GSP---can be achieved under general constraints.

Keywords: Matching with constraints; efficient matching; generalized matroid; strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-05-30
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewFile/20250481/41951/1281 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:6039

Access Statistics for this article

Theoretical Economics is currently edited by Federico Echenique, Mira Frick, Pablo Kurlat, Juuso Toikka, Rakesh Vohra

More articles in Theoretical Economics from Econometric Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Martin J. Osborne ().