Probabilistic verification in mechanism design

Ian Ball () and Deniz Kattwinkel ()
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Ian Ball: Department of Economics, MIT
Deniz Kattwinkel: Department of Economics, UCL

Theoretical Economics, Forthcoming

Abstract: We introduce a model of probabilistic verification in mechanism design. The principal elicits a message from the agent and then selects a test to give the agent. The agent's true type determines the probability with which he can pass each test. We characterize whether each type has an associated test that best screens out all other types. If this condition holds, then the testing technology can be represented in a tractable reduced form. We use this reduced form to solve for profit-maximizing mechanisms with verification. As the verification technology varies, the solution continuously interpolates between the no-verification solution and full surplus extraction.

Keywords: Probabilistic verification; ordering tests; evidence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-01-30
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