Screening for breakthroughs

Gregorio Curello () and Ludvig Sinander ()
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Gregorio Curello: Department of Economics, University of Mannheim
Ludvig Sinander: Department of Economics and Nuffield College, University of Oxford

Theoretical Economics, Forthcoming

Abstract: How best to incentivise disclosure? We study this question in a general model in which a technological breakthrough occurs at an uncertain time and is privately observed by an agent, and a principal must incentivise disclosure via her control of a payoff-relevant physical allocation. We uncover a deadline structure of optimal mechanisms: they have a simple deadline form in an important special case, and a graduated deadline structure in general. We apply our results to the design of unemployment insurance schemes.

Keywords: Dynamic mechanism design; delegation; disclosure; deadline (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 E24 J65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-06-03
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