 Objective rationality and uncertainty averse preferences, ()
Theoretical Economics, 2016, vol. 11, issue 2 Abstract: As in Gilboa, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Schmeidler \cite{GMMS}, we consider a decision maker characterized by two binary relations: $\succsim^{\ast}$ and $\succsim^{{\small \wedge}}$. The first binary relation is a Bewley preference. It\ models the rankings for which the decision maker is sure. The second binary relation is an uncertainty averse preference, as defined by Cerreia-Vioglio, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Montrucchio \cite{CMMM}. It models the rankings that the decision maker expresses if he has to make a choice. We assume that $\succsim^{{\small \wedge}}$ is a completion of $\succsim^{\ast}% $.\ We identify axioms under which the set of probabilities and the utility index representing $\succsim^{\ast}$ are the same as those representing $\succsim^{{\small \wedge}}$. In this way, we show that Bewley preferences and uncertainty averse preferences, two different approaches in modelling decision making under Knightian uncertainty, are complementary. As a by-product, we extend the main result of Gilboa, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Schmeidler \cite{GMMS}, who restrict their attention to maxmin expected utility completions. Keywords: Ambiguity; Bewley preferences; uncertainty averse preferences; preferences completion (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:1193 Access Statistics for this article Theoretical Economics is currently edited by Simon Board, Todd D. Sarver, Juuso Toikka, Rakesh Vohra, Pierre-Olivier Weill More articles in Theoretical Economics from Econometric Society |
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